Indonesia in 2024: Strengthening of Dynasties and the Military – A Decline in Democracy

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The year 2024 was expected to be marked by high political tensions, shifting socio-political dynamics, and significant political change. With Indonesian President Joko Widodo (known as Jokowi) completing his second five -year term in October 2024, general elections were scheduled for February 2024 to elect a new president. However, the actual political landscape turned out to be less tumultuous than anticipated, showcasing more continuity in governance than change.

This situation involved the planned orchestration of political change by outgoing President  Jokowi. To secure political influence for himself and his family, he struck a deal with his defense minister, retired Army General Prabowo Subianto. In exchange for Prabowo’s support in the election campaign, the well-connected 72-year-old promised to continue all of Jokowi’s initiatives and to appoint Jokowi’s young son, Gibran, as vice president.

Jokowi then facilitated Prabowo’s electoral victory in the February 2024 elections, leading to Prabowo being sworn in as the new president on October 18, 2024.In 2024, Indonesia underwent a government transition, yet the reality is that continuity prevailed over change. The retention of 16 ministers from President Jokowi’s administration in the cabinet of the new president Prabowo — especially in critical areas like Finance and Home Affairs —demonstrated a clear commitment to stability. Prabowo has also unequivocally pledged to advance Jokowi’s hallmark initiatives, such as nickel downstreaming and the construction of a new capital in East Kalimantan. This solidified Jokowi’s position as a pivotal and influential figure in Indonesian politics, proving that he is far from being a mere political retiree.

Jokowi, who was once a political newcomer when he entered the political stage as mayor of the Central Javanese city of Solo in 2005, was able to build a political dynasty  that will continue to exert significant political influence even after the end of Jokowi’s time as president of the country. Family dynasties are a bad feature for any democracy because they contradict the principle of equality and are a striking example of nepotism. When political positions are given to family members instead of the most qualified person, the principle of meritocracy, in which political power is vested in individual people based on professional capability, talent, and achievements, is grossly neglected. Political orders run by a small circle of family clans are not in accordance with democracy, which stresses the rule of law and the equality of people.

Jokowi’s political maneuver to lift his politically relatively inexperienced son Gibran to the vice-presidency is both questionable and damaging to Indonesia’s fragile democracy. The Constitutional Court’s decision to allow Gibran to run despite being younger than the minimum age of 40 was facilitated mainly by Jokowi’s brother-in-law, who at the same time is Gibran’s uncle, Constitutional Court Chairman Anwar Usman. A few weeks later, the Ethics Council of the Constitutional Court ordered the removal of Anwar from his leadership post and banned him from participating in electoral matters. He was found guilty of “serious ethical breach” when he used his position to pave the way for the candidacy of Gibran. However, the very questionable decision remained, and Gibran was sworn in as Vice-President in October 2024.

Jokowi’s dynastic intentions are further exacerbated by the fact that he also sent his second son, 29-year-old Kaesang Pangarep, into politics. Two days after he joined the Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (Indonesian Solidarity Party) without any previous political experience, he was elected as the new party chairman in September 2023. For 2024, his father planned to install him as Vice-Governor of the Central Java province, which is with 37.6 million citizens, one of the country’s politically and economically most important provinces. As in the case of his older brother, Kaesang faced the problem that he was too young to run as Vice-Governor candidate, so that his candidacy was refused by the Election Commission. The case went up to the Constitutional Court, which replaced Kaesang’s uncle Anwar with  a more non-biased judges, who confirmed the ban against Kaesang in the meantime. However, the regional elections in November 2024 saw another Jokowi clan member taking over an important political position. Bobby Nasution, who is married to Jokowi’s daughter, was elected governor of North Sumatra.

The rising importance of dynasties in Indonesian politics is further underlined by the fact that more than 100 of the 575 representatives in the national House of Representatives are members of political clans. In the past, there have also been some indications of dynasty politics in Indonesia. Still, it has risen to such a degree that Indonesia now more and more resembles the Philippines, a political system that has been dominated by a handful of family clans for decades. No wonder the country’s new PresidentPrabowo, is the son of a former important minister, and rose to power in the 1980s and 1990s by marrying the daughter of then-strongman Suharto.

However, the rise of dynasty politics is only one sign of the overall trend of democratic decline. The 2024 elections were the most unfair and rigged since the end of the authoritarian New Order in 1998. The Prabowo-Gibran couple was massively supported by the state apparatus, which was composed mostly oflocal governments, themedia, the army, the police. In addition, large amounts of state money disguised as “social aid” were distributed among poorer voters to secure votes for Prabowo and Gibran. At the annual Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly) plenary session in August 2024, House of Representatives Speaker Puan Maharani lamented the declining state of democracy in Indonesia. She also indirectly criticized Jokowi when she stated that Indonesia is “a country for everyone, not just for one person or group.” She asked rhetorically about the elections in February 2024: “The people have voted through elections, but were the elections conducted in a free, honest and fair process? Answer it yourselves.”

In the parliamentary elections, which were held on the same day as the presidential elections, eight parties could get over the four-percent threshold. In the aftermath of the elections, seven parties decided to support the Prabowo administration. Only the PDI-P did not join the government coalition but also stated that they did not want to be seen as opposition but rather as a critical government partner. So far, the checks and balances between the executive and the legislative branches of government, which are a typical feature of democracy in a presidential government system, will not be substantial. This is not new because between 2019 and 2024, the Jokowi administration already controlled more than 80 percent of the seats in the national parliament.

What was new was that the Prabowo government formed an oversized cabinet to reward all coalition parties and other social forces.  The current cabinet of President Prabowo is the biggest in Indonesian history and includes 48 ministers, 56 deputy ministers, and five heads of ministerial-level agencies. This bloated cabinet only became possible after the House of Representatives lifted the 34-minister limit at short notice, which had previously been set by a law in 2008. It is also remarkable that 15 ministers are from the Armed Forces.

The growing importance of the military can be seen as another critical aspect of the decline of democracy. This tendency is not new, but in the last years of the Jokowi government, many retired members of the armed forces and the police were appointed to key positions in the government. The late Jokowi government also increasingly supported the military’s efforts to take on non-defense roles.

This trend was continued by the newly elected President Prabowo, who began his term with a three-day cabinet retreat at the military academy in Magelang, Central Java. President Prabowo explained that this “boot camp” was intended to promote discipline and unity among his cabinet. All ministers had to appear in military fatigue, spend two nights in temporary tents, and undergo military roll calls. Prabowo also announced the establishment of new Kodam (regional military commands) to reinforce the existing ones. Strengthening the Army structure by forming new military commands and integrating them into the local administration risks blurring the lines between military and civilian functions at the local level.

The military also plays a decisive role in Prabowo’s new priority program, distributing state-sponsored food and milk for all schoolchildren. The local structures of the Indonesian Armed Forces organize the distribution of this government flagship program. Critics complained that the high budget expenditure for the program was not in reasonable proportion to the expected positive effects.

Indeed, 2025 started with significant budget cuts for all Indonesian national ministries. It is revealing that only the defense, police, parliament, and the judicial sector were spared from budget cuts. The education sector, for one, had to accept significant reductions as did the welfare state and social policy sectors. Budget cuts in the transportation sector directly stopped all public transport in Yogyakarta and the island of Bali. In mid-February 2025, student organizations around Indonesia organized the first anti-Prabowo demonstrations. They protested against budget cuts in the education sector and also against the militarization of the country.

The Prabowo administration also announced that Indonesia would drastically reduce imports and should achieve self-sufficiency in food and energy as soon as possible. To stop food imports, the Prabowo government, under the command of the military, has begun building huge food plantations and has cleared forests and swamps on the outer islands to make room for the cultivation of manioc, soybeans, and rice. The new food plantations are expected to cover around three million hectares, which is roughly the size of Belgium. In addition, the government plans – despite resistance from the European Union – to convert huge forest areas into palm oil plantations because palm oil is Indonesia’s top export commodity.

The large-scale transformation of land into food estates and plantations will not only have a disastrous ecological impact but will also increase the number of land conflicts. According to the Indonesian civil society organization, Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria (Agrarian Reform Consortium), 3,503 people became victims of state violence and criminalization, and 70 people were killed between 2017 and 2023 in land conflicts between the national government and local citizens. These numbers will most probably increase if the Prabowo government implements its ambitious plans for the creation of food estates and plantations in the relatively sparsely populated Eastern islands of Indonesia. Prabowo’s plans to send thousands of convicted criminals and drug addicts after their release from prison to provinces in Eastern Indonesia to build up plantations under the instruction of the Armed Forces has received a largely negative echo from the local communities.

The labor situation in Indonesia has not improved in recent years despite the Prabowo government promising significant improvements during the election campaign. The overall sluggish economic development led to a continuation of the precarious situation of workers in Indonesia. In 2024 alone, around 100,000 people have been dismissed by companies. The trade unions’ main demands are an increase in minimum wage by eight to ten percent and canceling the so-called Omnibus laws, which were passed in 2021 and reduced workers’ rights. The working conditions are still often terrible, particularly in the booming mining sector. One of the hotspots in this regard is the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park (IMIP) in Central Sulawesi. The Serikat Buruh Industri Pertambangan (Mining Industry Labor Union) noted that throughout 2023-2024, the number of work accidents at IMIP reached 300 times, both minor, moderate, and severe work accidents, resulting in 31 workers dying.

The fact that the mining sector is booming in Indonesia has not only to do with increased demand for natural resources from other countries but also with the failure of the Indonesian government to implement a successful energy transition from fossil to renewable resources. Indonesia’s energy policy is still heavily geared towards coal-fired power plants. According to the Kementerian Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral Republik Indonesia (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of the Republic of Indonesia), coal (39.7 percent), oil (29.9 percent) and gas (17.1 percent) still account for by far the largest share of electricity generation in 2023, while all renewable energies such as geothermal energy together only accounted for 13.1 percent. For the upcoming year, the government plans to increase the percentage of coal in the energy mix. A new regulation on energy, passed in February 2025, postponed the 23 percent share target of renewable energy in the national energy mix to 2030 from its original target of 2025.

In conclusion, the 2024 change in government in Indonesia did not signify a fresh start for the nation’s political landscape. Instead, it represented a continuation of the Jokowi era, indicating that the deterioration in the quality of democracy that began under Jokowi would persist, raising concerns for the future of democratic governance in Indonesia.

The recent change in government has decisively favored political dynasties and the military. Political dynasties have further entrenched their power, while the military, which began to expand its influence under Jokowi, is set to become an even more dominant force under President Prabowo. These developments are unequivocally detrimental to the future of democracy in Indonesia.

Expect no significant social or political changes moving forward. Prabowo’s nationalist economic policy, which prioritizes environmental exploitation and resource extraction, will not address the pressing issues of poverty and inequality in the long run. Workers will continue to endure precarious working conditions, and any economic growth that occurs will benefit them only marginally.